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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether the Bank of Japan has practiced a 
monetarist rule since 1975. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) published a report in 
1975 stating it would pay close attention to the money supply (M2), and in 
1978 started announcing quarterly "forecasts" (targets) of monetary (M2) 
growth rates. Since 1975, the monetary growth rate has gradually declined, 
and inflation has subsided without causing any major fluctuations in output. 
This seems to be a successful example of a monetarist experiment. Has the 
BOJ practiced a monetrist rule, i.e., an announcement and. maintenance of an 
M2 growth target? 
This paper reveals that it has not. The BOJ "forecasts" were quite 
accommodative in that an unexpected increase in the actual money supply was 
incorporated into future "forecasts" to maintain the increase in the money 
supply. In other words, a "forecast" did not behave like a "target" under a 
strict monetarist rule. Testing a monetarist rule with "forecasts" is shown 
to be more powerful than testing with the actual process under some weak 
assumptions. One of the necessary assumptions is that "forecasts" are 
identical to rational expectations, and the rational expectations hypothesis 
is not rejected by the data. Thus, we conclude that the answer to the 
question posed by the title is negative. 
Correspondence should be directed to: 
Professor Takatoshi Ito  
Institute of Economic Research 
Hitotsubashi University 
Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186 JAPAN 
"Japan i l l u s t r a t e s a p o l i c y that i s l e s s monetarist in 
rhetor ic than the p o l i c i e s followed by the United Sta tes and 
Great Bri ta in but far more monetarist in p r a c t i c e . " 
(Milton Friedman (1985, p .27) ) 
"[T]he Bank of Japan i s now at i t s zeni th as f a r , as the 
autonomy of monetary po l i cy i s concerned. . . . Japan's 
monetary management a f t er the second o i l c r i s i s can be 
regarded as one of the most success fu l such experiences in 
any indus tr ia l i z ed country. (Hamada and Hayashi (1985; p .83) ) 
1. Introduction 
While the r i s e and f a l l of monetarism prompted many debates and 
r e s e a r c h papers i n the United S t a t e s , the Bank of Japan (BOJ) conducted a 
sound, but not loud, monetary p o l i c y . — An important p a r t of the BOJ 
po l i cy has been i t s emphasis on the money supply (M2+CD) as an " in te rmed ia te 
t a r g e t . " The Bank of Japan announced t h a t the money supply would be watched 
c l o s e l y in 1975, and the Bank of Japan s t a r t e d to announce a q u a r t e r l y 
" fo recas t " [mi toshi ] of the money supply (M2) i n the t h i r d qua r t e r of 1978. 
Although i t i s c a l l e d a " f o r e c a s t , " i t could have been c a l l e d a " t a r g e t " i f 
the Japanese c e n t r a l bank had p r e f e r r e d t o be more accura te and honest i n 
naming i t . Since 1975 the monetary growth r a t e has dec l ined g radua l ly and 
the i n f l a t i o n r a t e has a l s o decreased . But, r e a l income growth r a t e s 
remained s teady through the t u r b u l e n t pe r iod of the second o i l c r i s i s . For 
t h i s kind of performance, the Bank of Japan was h a i l e d by m o n e t a r i s t s . 
However, t h e r e i s a s ign of change r e c e n t l y . In response to a r i s i n g yen, 
the money supply was allowed to soar i n 1987. Although a surge in the money 
supply would s t i r a concern among m o n e t a r i s t s , no s ign of i n f l a t i o n e x i s t s 
i n Japan as of the end of 1988. 
In order to understand the Japanese monetary po l i cy a f t e r 1975, i t i s 
c r u c i a l t o determine how r i g i d l y the money supply t a r g e t i n g was executed. 
"Forecas t s" by the Bank of Japan provide important information for t h i s 
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investigation. However, many aspects of the targeting practices by the Bank 
of Japan have escaped close scrutiny. In this paper, I will examine various 
questions concerning the money supply targeting by analyzing the Bank of 
Japan "forecasts." Were "forecasts" by the Bank of Japan disguised 
"targets"? Was the target steady? Did the Bank of Japan conduct the policy 
to keep the money supply within the specified range? These questions will 
be investigated in the following sections. In order to focus on money 
supply targeting, other interesting aspects regarding Japanese monetary 
\2 policy will not be discussed in this paper. x— 
The main focus and contribution of this paper is an anlysis of the 
"forecasts" announced by the Bank of Japan. One might think that it is more 
important to examine whether the "actual" M2 money supply, as opposed, to 
"forecasts," followed a monetarist rule. An attempt to implement a 
monetarist rule is one thing but an actual implementation is another. 
However, there are two reasons to prefer to use "forecasts" in the test of a 
monetarist rule. First, a "forecast" is a target of the money supply, and 
contains less noise than an outcome. Actual money supply may deviate from a 
target due to unexpected demand (credit multiplier) shocks. Hence, 
econometric investigation using "forecasts" would have a better fit and 
produce more powerful hypothesis tests (see Section 3). Second, 
monetarists always argue that it is important not only to practice stable 
monetary policy, but also announce your intentions beforehand in order that 
the policy be most effective. Therefore, if a monetarist rule is intended 
and attempted, it should appear in the "forecasts." The "forecasts" by the 
Bank of Japan, which would represent these monetarist "targets," provide us 
with a rare opportunity to test a monetarist rule. 
Section 2 briefly reviews the debate over monetarism in the United 
- 2 -
States and outlines a conventional wisdom of recent Japanese monetary 
policy. Section 3 tests the rationality of "forecasts." Section 4, the 
core of this paper, tests various forms of monetarism using the "forecast" 
series of the Bank of Japan. Section 5 summarizes the findings of the 
paper. 
2. Overview: U.S. vs Japan 
2.A. United States: the Rise and Fall of Monetarism, 1979-1982 
In the 1960's and 1970's the U.S. conducted monetary policy in more or 
less a Keynesian manner, by interest rate targeting. After the sharp 
increase in the inflation rate in the late 1970s, the Federal Reserve 
announced on October 6, 1979 "new operating procedures" which suggested an 
implementation of monetarism. Then Chairman Paul Volker announced a major 
change in monetary policy "to support the objective of containing growth in 
the monetary aggregates... by placing greater emphasis on the supply of bank 
reserves and less emphasis on confining short-term fluctuations in the 
Federal funds rates." 
The target cone for Ml was announced and efforts were made to keep Ml 
within the target range. However, the actual path of Ml broke out of the 
cone too frequently. The weekly money supply announcement was closely 
watched by the market in order to forecast the Fed reaction to the surprise 
-> \3 
compoenet m the money supply. N— 
Inflation fell but only after the United States experienced the 
recession of 1981-82, the worst since the Great Depression. In response, 
the Fed permitted the money supply to increase beyond its target after the 
summer of 1982 and the policy implemented in October 1979 was formally 
abandoned in October 1982. After the monetary target was abandoned, the 
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growth in the money supply accelerated: Ml increased by only 6.5% in 1981, 
but it grew by 8.8% in 1982 and 9.7% in 1983. Despite repeated warnings 
from monetarists, inflation did not materialize from the higher growth rate 
of the money supply. At present, an Ml target is no longer announced. 
Monetarism has been pronounced "dead" for some time (Dewald (1988) and B. 
Friedman (1988)). 
Nonmonetarists concluded, from the experiment that it is neither 
possible nor desirable to target the money supply. The monetary tightening 
in 1981 due to an unrealistic goal in Ml growth hurt the economy. Moreover, 
nonmonetarists argue low inflation with a high monetary growth rate after 
1982 is solid evidence that monetarist theory is incorrect (Benjamin 
Friedman (1984, 1988)). On the other hand, Milton Friedman was skeptical 
about the prospect of practicing a monetarist policy in October 1979, and 
quickly disinherited the Fed experiment as non-monetarist (See McCallum 
(1984, 1985) and Milton Friedman (1984, 1985).) . ^ -
2.B. Japan: Was the Bank of Japan a closet Monetarist? 
Between 1956 and 1973, the Bank of Japan permitted monetary growth to 
fluctuate between fifteen and twenty-five percent per annum. The Bank cur-
tailed monetary growth when the international balance of payments became a 
binding constraint, but otherwise relaxed monetary growth to finance 
economic growth. In 1972, the M2 growth rate reached 26.5 percent. When the 
oil embargo of October 1973 hit Japan, there were already several factors 
contributing to inflationary pressure. A combination of domestic 
overstimulation, a mistake by the Bank of Japan, and quadrupling of oil 
prices caused the worst inflation since the 1950s. The WPI inflation soared 
to 31 percent in 1974. 
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In order to curb the high inflation rate and to prevent its resurgence, 
the Bank of Japan decided to put more emphasis on control of the money 
supply. The Bank of Japan (1975) analyzed the causal relationship between 
monetary aggregates and income and derived a conclusion that M2 had always 
led the price level (WPI). In its manifesto, the Bank of Japan (1975) 
announced that it would watch the the money supply (M2) growth rate more 
closely: 
"In order to achieve price stability and to strive for the 
appropriate development of the economy, it will be necessary to pay 
sufficient attention in the future to the movements of M2 in the 
management of monetary policy. ... Since the relationship between M2 
and ultimate policy objectives may change depending on regimes of the 
economy, it is an inappropriate policy management to announce and to 
machanically stick to the target of M2 growth rate. 
In actual management of policy, the growth rate of the money 
supply should be kept stable in cases when it is judged that no 
particularly large economic problems loom, ... Money-focused monetary 
policy in no way implies decreased importance for interest rate 
policy." (Bank of Japan (1975; pp. 10-11) and Bank of Japan (1987; 
p.328 for translation of part of the above quote)) 
Since 1975, the Bank of Japan gradually decreased the M2 growth rate 
and curbed flucturations around the trend as shown in Figure 1. The figure 
also shows that as the money supply growth rate gradually declined, so did 
the nominal GNP growth rate, but importantly the real GNP growth rate 
remained stable. Put simply, the gradual decline in the money supply growth 
rate reduced inflation without reducing real economic growth. This is 
possible when monetarist policies are correctly implemented. — Is the Bank 
of Japan a closet monetarist? Milton Friedman, a founding father of 
monetarism, thinks so. As shown in his quote at the beginning of this 
paper, Friedman praises the Bank of Japan for "practicing" monetarism 
without vocalizing it. 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
2C. Technical differences 
Although there is a parallel between the Bank of Japan's emphasis on 
the money supply since 1975 and the Federal Reserve Policy's "experiment" 
between 1979-82, care must be taken in making this comparison. There are 
some differences in technical details of monetary targeting of the two 
central banks. First, the Bank of Japan has targeted M2 (and M2+CD, after 
CDs started in 1979) while the Fed targeted Ml. The Bank of Japan believes 
that Ml is more volatile by nature, so it is difficult to target Ml, and its 
relation to income and inflation is believed to be weaker. Second, the 
Federal Reserve announces the money statistics weekly, while the Japanese 
monetary announcement comes only monthly. The Bank of Japan argues that 
announcements of weekly volatile movements might cause jittery reactions in 
financial markets. Third, it is cosmetic, but the Bank of Japan announces 
its statistics in terms of four-quarter (annual) increases instead of 
\ fi 
quarter-to-quarter changes. — Fourth, once a target "cone" was announced 
by the Fed it remained valid for roughly one year, while a forecast 
announced by the Bank of Japan was rebased every quarter. 
Given these differences in technical details, we will investigate 
whether the Bank of Japan pursued a monetarist rule using its "forecasts" as 
a monetary target announcement. 
3. "Forecasts" by the Bank of Japan 
3.A. Official Description 
First of all, let us review how the Bank of Japan itself described its 
"forecasts," In its publication, the Bank of Japan explains why it has 
- 6 -
adopted "money-focused monetary policy" and how exactly it has been 
implemented (Suzuki (1987; pp. 328-311). The following is a summary of the 
official description concerning its "forecast" announcement. 
On the basis of these ideas, a change in monetary management occurred 
in Japan, beginning in July 1978. Since that time, the Bank of Japan 
has made it a rule to announce, at the beginning of every quarter, an 
estimated value for the growth rate of the average outstanding balance, 
of the money supply relative to the same period in the previous year. 
This estimated value is called a forecast [mitoshi] and applies to the 
current quarter. (Suzuki (1987), p. 328) 
[T]he annual rate of increase is the focus of attention. ... Monetary 
policy in Japan focuses on M2+CDs but does not determine 'targets' in 
the strict sense of the word. Only 'forecasts' [mitoshi] are 
announced. However, the policy actions of the Bank of Japan itself are 
included in the determination of these forecasts, and in this sense the 
forecasts represent increases in the money supply that the Bank of 
Japan is willing to permit. (ibid, p.331) 
The above description tantalizes the reader who insists on knowing 
whether "mitoshi" is a "forecast" or a "target." One way to resolve this 
issue is to examine characteristics of "forecasts" and to determine whether 
"forecasts" are equivalent to monetarist "targets." In the following 
subsection, I will examine the track record of "forecasts" measured by the 
official description (four-quarter growth rate) and the quarter-to-quarter 
growth rate. I will also test whether the announced "forecasts" are 
"rational expectations" in the usual sense. 
3.B. Track Record 
(i) Official Four-quarter Basis 
The announced "forecasts" and ex post actual growth rates of M2+CD are 
summarized in Table 1. The difference between the mean of the forecast and 
actual growth rates are shown in the "shock" column of Table 1. The "large 
shock column" shows that the actual path strayed outside the forecast range 
only eight times in ten years. The most notable deviations occurred in 1987 
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when there were three straight quarters of under-forecasting. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
While these forecasts appear highly accurate, a few caveats are in 
order. First, in the original official announcement, the range of the 
"forecasts" is not accurately specified. Instead, only descriptive verbal 
expressions of the range (e.g. "about" 10 percent) are announced. The 
expression is interpreted numerically by using common sense to interpret the 
terminology (e.g. "about" = +/- 50 basis points; see Note 2 of Table 1). The 
upper and lower bounds as well as the mean are recorded. Second, since the 
announcement is deliberately vague as explained above, some rounding errors 
in the announcement are inevitable. For example, even if the Bank of Japan 
predicts the growth rate to be "10.18% +/- 0.48%," the Bank announcement 
would use the language: "about 10%." The same announcement may reflect a 
different target, e.g. "9.89% +/- 0.46%." This is one of the sources of an 
error term described later. 
Third, in the official announcement forecasts and actual (realized) 
rates are described in terms of growth rates (in percent) over the last four 
quarters. Denoting the announced (mean) forecast of the growth rate by TG, 
the level of M2 by M, and the Bank of Japan "forecast" of M2 for this 
quarter by EM, the definition of the forecast growth rate is: 
(3.1) TG(t) = 100*[EM(t)-M(t-4)]/M(t-4). 
Although a potential seasonality problem is avoided in this definition, the 
actual money growth in three out of four quarters covered in this forecast 
formula is already known. When three-quarters of a "forecast" have already 
been realized, it is no wonder that the forecasting record, Table 1 and 
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Figure 2, appears to be very good. 
(ii) Quarter-to-Quarter Basis 
As noted above, when a quarterly forecast over the 12-month growth rate 
forecast is announced, the last three quarters are known. Therefore, there 
is a possibility that the announced forecasts mask a subtle change (or no 
change) of "forecasts" inherent in the quarter-to-quarter growth rate. 
The actual growth rate for the last quarter is announced at the same 
time the "forecast" for this quarter is announced, and it is trivial to 
calculate quarter-to-quarter forecasts, denoted by QTG: 
The rate of change is multiplied by 400 in order to annualize the growth 
rate. This conversion is applied separately to the ceiling, mean, and floor 
of the forecasted statistics. The actual monetary growth rate, inflation, 
and GNP growth rates are also converted to the quarter-to-quarter basis and 
denoted respectively by QM, QCPI and QGNP: 
(3.3) Qx - 400*[x(t)-x(t-l)]/x(t-l), x = M, GPI, GNP. 
Table 2 shows the track record measured according to the quarter-to-quarter 
basis, 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Let us compare Table 1 (announced, four-quarter growth rate) with Table 
2 (implied, quarter-to-quarter growth rate) for the period 86:4 - 88:1. The 
announced "forecasts" increase gradually from 8.5% to 12.0%. However, the 
implied quarter-to-quarter forecasts decreased from 8.30% (86:4) to 6.69% 
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(87:2) and then jumped to 10.30% (87:3). Since there was a large jump in 
actual rates in 86:3 and 87:1, even a small rise in the four-quarter growth 
rate in 87:2 implies a decline the quarter-to-quarter growth rate. — 
Similarly, from 88:2 to 88:3, the quarter-to-quarter (mean) growth rate does 
not change, while the four-quarter (mean) growth rate registers a 1.5 point 
drop. 
Since the quarter-to-quarter basis contains more information, most 
analyses in the following sections use this definition. Regressions using 
the four-quarter basis are also done, and the results are similar to those 
below, so they are not reported in this paper. 
3,C. Rationality of "forecasts" 
So far I have not formally tested whether announced "forecasts" have 
predicted the true value without predictable bias. Below we will examine 
whether they were "rational," in that the forecast reaction function was a 
correct conditional expectation of the true money supply process. If the 
Bank of Japan "forecasts" are found to be "rational," the Bank of Japan did 
not systematically announce biased forecasts. It is consistent with a view 
that the Bank of Japan announced its best "forecast", taking into account 
all available information including its intended course of actions in the 
near future. 
A direct test of the hypothesis that the Bank of Japan forecast is its best 
conditional expectation given the information at the time of forecasting can 
be formulated as a standard test of "rational expectations." If rational 
expectations in the above sense holds, a "forecast," f(t), made at period t-
J. for a money at period t, is ar\ nnhiaspd predictor of ex post realized  
values, m(t) (unbiasedness test). This can be tested by the following 
equation: 
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(3.4) m(t) - m(t-l) = a + b*[f(t) - m(t-l)] + e(t) 
where e(t) is a disturbance term and the unbiasedness implies (a=0, b=-l). 
In addition, rational expectations imply that forecast errors are not 
correlated with any information which is available at the time of prediction 
\ 8 (orthogonality t e s t ) : * — 
(3.5) m(t) - f(t) - a + b*x(t) + e(t) 
where x(t) includes any information available at time t-1. In particular, I 
use the past forcast errors, GNP and CPI for x(t). The orthogonality of 
forecast errors with respect to information implies (a=0, b=0) Each test is 
performed both in terms of growth rates, where m(t)=QM(t), f(t)=QTG(t), x(t) 
in growth rates; and in terms of levels, m(t)=log M(t), f(t)=log(EM(t)), 
x(t) in log levels. Results are shown in Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
When the money supply growth rate is used, the rational expectations 
hypothesis is not rejected at the 5% significance level. When the level is 
used, the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 1% significance level, but 
barely rejected at the 5% significance level. Considering that the growth 
rate is used for an official announcement, we may conclude that a rational 
expectations hypothesis is not rejected by this investigation. In sum, the 
Bank of Japan "forecasts" can be regarded as what it considers the best 
conditional estimates of money growth rates in the next few months. 
Note that the information set on which conditional forecasts are based 
might contain the Bank of Japan is private information. The private 
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information may include its policy action to be exercised in the next few 
months, but not yet announced. In the null hypothesis of rational 
expectations, "forecasts" arB formed taking into account this private 
information, although the econometrician does not know its content. In that 
sense, having "forecasts" announced by the Bank of Japan is a powerful test 
of a monetarist rule. This advantage with the use of "forecasts" is 
analogous to the advantages of testing expectations hypotheses with "survey 
data" (see Mishkin (1983)). 
Although the above test would prove unbiasedness, it does not prove 
that the forecasts were efficient. The reader might wonder whether 
mechanical forecasts (of the VAR type) might have produced better results in 
terms of forecasting performance. However, a brief experimentation with a 
VAR model produced no better forecasts than the Bank of Japan forecasts (see 
Appendix). 
4 A Test for a Monetarist Rule 
Reactions of the Bank of Japan to its forecast errors reveal how 
monetary policy is conducted. Suppose there is positive forecast error, 
that is the money supply grew at a faster rate than the forecast. The 
monetarist k% rule would prescribe a compensating decrease in the next 
quarter in response to the positive forecast error in order to keep a k% 
growth rate in the target period, say a year. Accomodative monetary policy 
would allow a higher money supply, given that the increase was caused by 
demand shocks. Below I will formulate an econometric test based on this 
idea. 
Suppose—that—the—level of the money supply, after—detrending,—was 
targeted to be constant for the last four quarters. The actual path was 
right on target from t-4 to t-2, but it was revealed that the money supply 
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jumped by 1 % from t-2 to t-1. (See Figure 2.) In the very beginning of 
period t, when the official "forecast" is announced, how does the Bank of 
Japan target the money supply for the quarter? 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
There are three scenarios: Case 1 (Complete Accomodation). If the jump 
is judged to have been caused by a permanent, 1 % increase in the growth 
rate of money demand, then the quarter-to-quarter growth rate will 
"forecast" to rise by 1% from t-1 to t; Case ,2 (Bygones are bygones, 
monetarism with rebasing) . If the jump was judged to have been caused by a 
one-time idiosyncratic shock, the monetary authority may want to keep the 
money supply constant after rebasing; and Case 3^  (Rigid Monetarism). If a 
rigid monetarist rule is pursued, then the positive jump should be 
compensated by a subsequent negative jump to maintain the long-run target. 
In addition to these three hypotheses, another interesting hypothesis 
is that the money supply target is independent of economic conditions. 
According to rigid monetarism, fluctuations in the money supply should be 
independent of fluctuations in economic growth or inflation. Fine-tuning is 
a dangerous practice according to a monetarist. Hence, target adjustments 
should also be independent of fluctuations in these variabes. If money 
supply management follows fine-tuning as advocated by traditional 
Keynesians, the money supply target will react to conditions of inflation 
and growth. 
The following two specifications are investigated. 
(4.1) log(EM(t))-log(M(t-l)) = k + a*TREND + b*[log(EM(t-l)-log(M(t-l))] 
+ c*QCPI(t-l) 4- d*QGNP(t) + e(t) 
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(4.2) log(EM(t))-log(M(t-l)) - k + a*TREND + $ bj*(logEM(t-j)-logM(t-j)) 
J 
+ 2 Cj*(QCPI) + 2 dj*(QGNP(t-j)) + e(t). 
J J 
where j = 1,2,3,4. The (4.1) specification uses information from forecast 
errors and other information at period t-1. In specification, (4.2), 
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forecast errors and other information in the past four quarters are used.x— 
Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, the money supply target should be 
independent of economic conditions and. no trend is allowed (a = c = d =0). 
If rigid monetarism (k% rule, case 3 above) is adopted, and the growth rate 
in target levels remains constant overtime (b=l): 
log(EM(t)) - log(EM(t-l)) = k 
where the a*TREND term allows for a gradual decline in the target money 
supply growth rate. Instead, if the target growth rate is independent of 
this information, after rebasing the money supply every period (case 2 
above), the target remains constant, i.e., b=0, so: 
Therefore b > 0 would be consistent with some forms of monetarism, while a 
rejection of b > 0 would imply a rejectio of a practice of monetarism. 
Results of specification (4.1) and (4.2) are shown in Table 4 (with 
one lag) and Table 5 (with four lags), respectively. Table 4 shows that b 
is estimated to be significantly negative. The hypothesis that the estimated 
b is equal to zeso is rejected at the 1% level in all cases. The negative 
sign on b implies that a recent "surprise" increase in the actual money 
supply causes the Bank of Japan to increase its next "forecast" by more than 
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what has already occurred (bygones). Table 5 shows that even when four lags 
are allowed, the sum of coefficients on the past forecast errors are 
significnatly negative. Again, a hypothesis that the estimated b is equal 
to zero is rejected at the 1% level in all cases. This is strong evidence 
for an accommodative policy in money supply management. A case of negative 
b remains valid even if information on inflation and/or the GNP growth 
rates are added. 
Therefore, the evidence rejects the hypothesis that the Bank of Japan 
practiced a strict monetarist rule. The estimated b implies that any 
increase in the level of money supply is treated as bygones, and moreover a 
further increase in the money supply will be accommodated. 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here 
Insignificant estimates of c and d in Table 4 suggest that recent 
inflation or real GNP growth does not affect the target money supply growth 
rate. The last finding is evidence against the hypothesis that the Bank of 
Japan practiced quarter-to-quarter fine-tuning in response to inflation and 
GNP growth. However, in Table 5, inflation over the previous four quarters 
is shown to influence (with the statistical significance level of 2%) the 
money supply growth rate. 
In sum, we find that Japanese monetary policy was conducted in a manner 
that was far different from the monetarist k% rule. When the actual money 
supply deviated from the target, there was no effort, expressed in forming 
the next target, to correct the deviation. A jump was not only treated as a 
bygone,—but—prompted a further jump in the same direction for—the—future 
target. Neither inflation nor the GNP growth rate affected the change in 
the money supply target. 
- 15 -
In the United States from 1979 to 1982, the market correctly believed 
that the Fed was conducting strict monetary targeting, in that any 
unexpected increase in the money supply (out of the "cone") would be pulled 
back by a compensating decrease in the money supply in the near future. In 
other words, the market rationally expected that the estimate of b in the 
quarter-to-quarter regressions above to be significantly positive. Thus, as 
many studies have shown, the interest rate and the exchange rate responded 
to the unexpected change in money supply within hours of money announcements 
during the monetarist regime in the United States. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The findings in this paper suggest that the Bank of Japan did not 
practice what monetarists preach, contrary to praise voiced by U.S. 
monetarists. Although the Bank of Japan announced a "forecast" which could 
be interpretted as monetary targeting, the forecasts were accomodative so 
that they would violate monetarist rules. In particular, when there is an 
unexpected jump in the money supply, the base is adjusted to a new level 
(bygones are bygones) and a further accomodation (b<0) in growth is allowed 
in the new "forecasts." 
Moreover, even if the Bank of Japan practiced monetarism without 
vocalizing it, the Bank might have abandoned the principle, again without 
announcing it, in 1987, when the M2+CD growth rate jumped to 10.4 percent 
from 8.7 percent in 1986. This surge in money supply is due partly to 
financial deregulation, and partly to an adoption of a target zone for the 
exchange rate (see I to (1989)). 
"Forecasts" by the Bank of Japan were found to be rational, in that 
they were the best conditional forecasts the Bank of Japan could make 
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according to our tests. The actual and "forecast" processes responding to 
various public information are very similar. Hence, non-monetarist 
"forecast" announcements can be regarded as a true reflection of the actual 
managment of the money supply. (As explained in Section 3, there is an 
econometric advantage to use "forecasts" rather than ex post money supply.) 
The Bank of Japan "forecasts" are better than mechanical forecasts, 
suggesting that private information of the Bank of Japan is important. 
In the United States, many researchers observed that the monvement of 
monetary aggregates during the monetarist experiment of 1979-82 has no 
resemblance to what monetarists preached, leaving a question whether a 
monetarist rule was attempted and failed or whether it was not attempted at 
all. This paper shows that even in Japan, where the monetarists and their 
sympathisers suggest that monetarist theory has been proven effective, 
monetarism in the strict sense was never practiced. In fact, it appears 
that the Bank of Japan is a non-monetarist in practice but is hesitant to 
appear a non-monetarist in official announcements. This is most evident in 
its announcement form, the monetary announcements. By publishing the four-
quarter growth rate. The central bank hides the large fluctuations in 
quarter-to-quarter growth rates. 
One might wonder what made monetarism (or rhetoric of monetarism) gain 
popularity in the mid seventies in both the United States and Japan, and why 
the theory is not completely dismissed by the central banks. The answer 
could be political rather than economic: By highlighting the money supply 
as an intermediate target, it gives the central bank a convenient, and 
perhaps justified, argument when its tight monetary policy i.s opposed by 
other branches of the government. Pierce (1984) suggests that "(p)erhaps 
the Fed had not really embraced monetarism. It may have found that focusing 
- 17 -
on money growth was a convenient means of absolving itself from 
responsibility for the record-high interest rates that occurred." According 
to this view, the monetrist rule may be a weapon that a central bank needs 
only in an emergency. The Bank of Japan may as well maintain a monetarist 
rhetoric, i.e., by announcing "forecasts," just in case the Bank of Japan 
needs to absolve itself from responsibility for raising the official 
\10 discount rate in opposition to political powers. x — 
- 18 -
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Table 1: "Forecast" and Actual M2+CD Growth Rate: 
Compared to the same quarter of preceding year 
Notes to Table 1 
1. Quarterly M2+CD is a three-month average of monthly average 
balances. To be precise, before May 1979, no CDs were issued. 
Thus, original statistics are M2 before 1979:3 and M2+CD on and 
after 1979:3. 
2. An actual announcement of a "forecast" does not contain the 
range, but certain wording suggesting some range. The following 
is my interpretation of the expression: 
Japanese interpretation English 
expression low target high translation 
10.0 zengo 9.5 10.0 10.5 around 10.0 
10.0 dai 10.0 10.5 11.0 the 10s 
10.0 teido 9.75 10.0 10.25 near 10.0 
10.0 jaku 9.5 9.75 10.0 less than 10.0 
* 10.0 10.75 11.5 ** 
* 10.0 dai, jakkan no fure wa attemo 11.0 zengo. 
** the 10s, but could be around 11.0 
3. Periods of "large shocks" are defined as ones in which 
actual growth rates are either above the high or below the low of 
the forecasts. In the former, the difference between actual and 
high, in the latter, the difference between actual and low are 
recorded. 
Tables - 2 -
TABLE 2: Conversion to Quarter-to-Quarter Growth Rates 
"Forecast" and Actual M2+CD Growth Rate 
Implied quarter-to-quarter rate 
—___ Forecast • Actual Shocks Large shocks 
Qtr Low Mean High Act-Mean Outside(L,H) 
78 :3 8.87 11.63 14.39 13.06 1.43 
78 :4 9.52 11.35 13.18 10.25 -1.10 
79 :1 8.94 10.76 12.59 9.93 -.83 
79 :2 12.76 14.60 16.44 13.84 -.76 
79 :3 10.14 11.98 13.81 10.91 -1.06 
79 :4 5.80 7.63 9.47 8.33 .70 
80 :1 4.62 5.54 6.46 7.93 2.39 +1.47 
80 :2 11.42 13.29 15.16 11.80 -1.49 
80 :3 8.67 9.60 10.53 4.42 -5.18 -4.25 
80 :4 6.03 6.97 7.92 6.13 -.84 
81 :1 4.05 4.99 5.94 7.11 2.11 +1.17 
81 :2 9.66 11.57 13.49 13.07 1.50 
81 :3 8.57 10.45 12.32 10.76 .31 
81 :4 7.67 9.53 11.38 9.78 .25 
82 :1 6.86 8.70 10.54 7.21 -1.49 
82 \2 8.98 10.85 12.71 7.75 -3.09 -1.23 
82 :3 8.23 10.11 11.99 10.25 .14 
82 :4 4.01 5.89 7.76 6.14 .27 
83 :1 3.18 5.07 6.95 5.31 .24 
83: :2 5.61 7.51 9.40 7.90 .39 
83 :3 6.04 7.95 9.86 8.21 .26 
83' .4 3.99 5.89 7.78 6.62 .74 
84' :1 4.57 6.46 8.36 8.16 1.70 
84: :2 6.20 8.09 9.98 6.44 -1.65 
84 :3 7.96 9.86 11.76 9.23 -.63 
84: 4 5.37 7.25 9.14 6.78 -.47 
85: :1 6.74 8.64 10.53 8.32 -.31 
85: 2 4.87 6.76 8.64 7.99 1.23 
85: 3 6.11 7.99 9.88 8.96 .97 
85: 4 5.82 7.70 9.58 9.54 1.84 
86: 1 6.49 8.36 10.23 8.38 .16 
86: 2 4.23 7.03 9.84 5.97 -1.07 
86: 3 7.21 9.09 10.98 10.34 1.24 
86: 4 6.42 8.30 10.18 7.71 -.60 
87: 1 5.20 7.09 8.97 10.13 3.04 +1.15 
87: 2 4.82 6.69 8.55 10.46 3.77 +1.91 
87: 3 8.43 10.30 12.16 13.27 2.98 +1.11 
87: 4 8.45 10.29 12.13 11.47 1.18 
88: 1 8.95 10.78 12.61 10.97 .19 
88: 2 8.44 10.27 12.10 7.74 -2.53 -0.70 
88: 3 8.42 10.27 12.13 11.76 1.49 
88: 4 8.13 9.99 11.84 
Notes See notes to Table 1. 
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Table 3: Tests of Rational Expectation 
Tables - 4 -
Table 4: Determinants of Targets: Quarter-to-quarter growth rate: One lag 
Tables - 5 -
Table 5: Determinants of Targets: Quarter-to-quarter growth rate: Four Lags 
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Figure I : Honey Stock and CUP in Japan 
Figure 2: Hypothetical Money Supply Path 
Appendix: Were the Bank of Japan "forecasts" better than mechanical forecasts? 
As explained, in Section 3, if we find an econometric model (eq. (3.11)) 
which performs significantly better than the BoJ forecasts (eq. (3.9)), it 
implies that either the Bank of Japan deliberately announces "biased." 
forecasts (which is unlikely on the basis of the evidence in the main text) 
or that private information is not valuable enough to compensate for 
rounding errors in announcement. 
After some experiments, I produced two simple models that trace the 
actual path of money supply reasonably well. Model 1 is a simple 
autoregressive model of the quarterly money supply level, and Model 2 uses 
information on both the money supply and real GNP. The second model also 
includes a trend term. In both cases, the rolling regression is performed 
to simulate forecasts using only information available at the time of the 
forecast. Then the one-step ahead forecast of the M2 level is translated 
into the four-quarter growth rate. Mechanical forecasts are compared 
against the BoJ forecasts in terms of mean absolute forecast errors. 
I also found, in the process of experiments, that forecasts based on 
the level of the money supply have more precision than forecasts based on 
growth rates directly. 
The mean absolute error (MAE) for an entire sample from 78:3 to 88:2 
was 0.348 for the BoJ forecast, compared with 0.485 for Model 1, and 0.478 
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for Model 2. For the latter half of the sample (83:3 -88:2), the BOJ 
forecast MAE was .353, while the two models' MAEs were 0.393 and 0.398. The 
BoJ forecasts are better than the econometrician's best effort, although the 
performance edge does not seem to be overwhelming. There are several ways 
to interpret these results. The results imply that the importance of having 
private information, PR(t-l) outweighs the possibility of non-honest 
announcement (i.e., k ^ k, b ^ b, c ^ c ) ; and the rounding errors w(t), and 
the econometrician having imprecise estimates due to small samples (i.e., k 
A A 
^ k , b ^ b , c ^ c ) . Put differently, if rational expectations are assumed, 
and if the econometrician has true parameter values, then the results show 
that PR(t-l) is very important in forecasting the money supply process. Yet 
another way of interpreting these results is to regard them as support for 
rational expectations, given that there are a few variables which are 
private information of the Bank of Japan, and that the econometrician can 
try many specifications. 
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